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TENETS OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY WARFARE
Shortly after 11 September 2001, the United States was confronted with the stark reality of being involved in a transnational war against terrorism. Although some scholars, political pundits, members of the media and officials have come to question the exactitude of the phrase "war on terrorism", the prospect of U.S. forces becoming engaged in counter-insurgency or guerrilla style warfare in the future to cope with the menace of terrorism remains likely. To be sure, I am not asserting guerrilla warfare is the only option available to terrorists, jihadists, or other extremists; the war in Vietnam is a notable example of how an extremist group, the Viet Minh, was able to adeptly combine guerrilla and conventional forces into a program of hybrid warfare; warfare in which irregular and conventional organizations fight in mutually supporting operations.
1 Nevertheless, if one concedes the United States (U.S.) will be engaged in counterinsurgency or counter-guerrilla operations as a matter of course for the foreseeable future, despite the distressing nature of such a prospect, it will be worthwhile to engage in a discussion about attempting to determine if there are any principles or tenets of counter-insurgency operations in order to optimize conditions for success by U.S. forces on that type of battlefield.
Accordingly, this essay proposes a series of tenets pertaining to counter-insurgency warfare with corresponding analyses supporting each tenet. The tenets have been placed into four broad categories (strategic, operational, logistical, and cultural) because the research ostensibly permits using such taxonomy. (New York, Praeger, 1962) . Valeriano and Bohanna consider the greatest imperative for guerrillas is "to gain active support or at least passive toleration from a majority of the people in the area of operations." p. 19. Additionally, for an excellent discussion about the nature, goals, and approaches which ought to be considered in a counterinsurgency campaign, a review of the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide is essential. Although the guide goes beyond the scope of this work, the following excerpt is highly insightful: "…the intent of a COIN campaign is to build popular support for a government while marginalizing the insurgents: it is therefore fundamentally an armed political competition with the insurgents. Consequently, control (over the environment, the population, the level of security, the pace of events, and the enemy) is the fundamental goal of COIN, a goal that distinguishes it from peace operations or humanitarian intervention. Within these broad characteristics, the specific nature of any particular COIN campaign arises from the complex interaction of three key factors: the characteristics of the environment (physical, economic, political and human) in which it takes place; the nature of the insurgent group (or groups); and the nature of the counterinsurgent government and its security forces. Holding territory, providing security, and providing basic services on a continual basis serve to threaten an insurgency more than direct military engagements. The longer an insurgency can effectively challenge a government's ability to provide security and services, the greater the likelihood the effected population will consider the government to be ineffective and, eventually, illegitimate.
6. Leverage factionalism. While the existence of factions might deny a government the ability to focus on one center of gravity, savvy policy makers can leverage factionalism in order to exacerbate intra-insurgency or inter-insurgency rivalry. The identification of different ideologies or objectives among insurgent groups should be promoted in order to develop and exacerbate tension amongst the groups. During the Philippine War (1899-1902) American forces were confronted with an insurgency led by Emilio Aguinaldo.
Aguinaldo was an ethnic Tagalog and so were most of the insurgents. U.S. forces in the Philippines were able to recruit scouts from non-Tagalog groups who were familiar with the countryside and the sentiments of the local population because of non-Tagalog concerns about the insurgency being dominated by ethnic Tagalog's. 9 The efficacy of exploiting differences among insurgent groups is also evinced in El Salvador during the 1980s. The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) was never a homogenous organization, rather it was an alliance of guerrilla groups organized in Havana which were highly suspicious of and even hostile to each other. 10 As the El Salvadoran Army became more professional and as the population increasingly came to view the government as legitimate, the challenges facing the FMLN increased. With greater pressure against the guerrillas and a non-supportive population to contend with, fissures within the FMLN began to appear. As the government continued its counterinsurgent program of military professionalization and respect for the population, dismemberment of the FMLN accelerated.
9 Joes, America and Guerrilla Warfare, p. 109.
10 Ibid., p. 268.
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Having discussed the strategic tenets of counter-insurgency warfare, let us now turn to the operational tenets. I am categorizing as "operational" those military issues which can have an impact on policy makers but are not usually matters of policy. For example, the morale of a state's armed forces can have an impact on a nation's ability to meet national security threats;
however, the issue of morale is normally relegated to the purview of the leadership of the armed forces, not policy makers. This means the size of a government's forces must be large enough to cover a wide area while maintaining a portion large enough to actually conduct offensive operations against the insurgents themselves. Essentially, a government must deny sanctuary for the guerrillas within its borders while having an offensive arm to physically pursue and attack the guerrillas. In keeping with this tenet, indigenous forces should be used to the maximum extent available and in accordance with the requisite level of professionalism.
Indigenous forces possess knowledge of terrain, culture, language and access to intelligence beyond that of U.S. forces. 12 Additionally, it must be pointed out expanding the capacity of the host-nation's police force is also extremely important. Police are often the largest element of a host-nation's security forces, and the U.S. military must be prepared to advise, assist and properly train a host-nation's police force in light of the facts they operate very closely with the population and can serve as a vital bulwark in counter-insurgency operations upon obtaining the confidence and support of the local communities; a confidence which is engendered via a police forces' adherence to the rule and professional behavior.
3. Obtain better intelligence. In light of the unique challenges posed by a counterinsurgency campaign, particularly the ability of the insurgents' ability to easily blend within the civil population, the collection and prompt exploitation of intelligence is vital.
Good treatment of the civil population can serve as an intelligence boon for the government.
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In the same vein, good treatment of prisoners, especially insurgent prisoners, can be of tremendous benefit. It is worthwhile to remember some insurgents are impressed or join under false pretenses such as purported acts of brutality or atrocities committed by the military. In other cases insurgents are made to serve under conditions of duress such as threats made against the lives of family members. Good treatment of prisoners can serve to debunk many of the distortions and propaganda promulgated by insurgent leaders as well as induces some captives to turn against the insurgency by willingly providing intelligence to the government. Also, another method of obtaining intelligence is by infiltrating the insurgents' ranks. As government forces become more effective, an insurgency will become more desperate to find recruits and this will provide greater opportunity for government agents to penetrate the insurgent organization. "Scouring a given territory for hidden fields and storehouses…uncovered many food caches" and caused many insurgents to resort to growing or stealing food rather than fighting the Americans. The American food denial campaign seriously hurt both the guerrillas' morale and their health; guerrilla life in any country and any conflict is often filled with hardships; for the Philippine insurgents, the lack of medical facilities and the decreasing food supplies meant increasing illness." 
and time of their choosing. Successfully attacking targets of opportunity helps to foster a reputation of competence for the insurgents while simultaneously undermining that of the government's.
6.
Decentralized execution and adapt tactics to local conditions. Although a counter-insurgency strategy is important in order to insure the disparate military, political, economic, and informational components of such a campaign are well integrated and synchronized, the conduct of the military component of the campaign requires decentralized execution. Small unit leaders must be empowered not only to conduct tactical operations but to work directly with the local population and its leaders in order to enhance the legitimacy and prestige of the government and its affiliates.
III. Logistical Considerations
The requirement governing logistics considerations in the counter-insurgency campaign can be distilled into the following formula: counter-insurgency operations must enable friendly sustainment, deny sustainment to hostile elements, and enhance security effectiveness.
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"living off the land" can promote mobility and speed by reducing some logistical requirements, it exposes government forces to the same perils and challenges faced by the insurgents. 16 This can be an acutely critical problem for U.S. forces during the initial stages of an anti-insurgent campaign when the local population might be unwilling or unable to provide logistical support because of threats made by the insurgents or because of a lack of confidence by the population. Accordingly, a counter-insurgency campaign must ensure food, ammunition, and medical supplies are routinely provided to government forces; otherwise the risks of malnutrition, sickness, low morale, and defection increase. There is, however, a corollary to this tenet; it is: reliance on external sources of supply increases capability, but also increases dependence. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) became so dependent on U.S. materiel resources that after U.S. forces left in 1973, the ARVN could not hold their own against the North Vietnamese Army when Congress terminated their aid. This is a risk we might be running in Iraq and Afghanistan. In both conflicts, the emerging local security forces are becoming dependent on U.S. capabilities.
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2. Provide and protect basic services. Effective marginalization of insurgents is not merely a consequence of direct action against the insurgents, but it must also aim at stymieing the flow of potential recruits into their ranks. When a host-government's ability to provide basic services (such as easy access to potable water; basic food stuffs; medical care; electrical power; and sanitary conditions in the neighborhoods) is tenuous or absent, U.S. sustainment operations must, at least initially, be prepared to provide and protect such services. Providing or restoring basic services on behalf of the host-nation government not only serves to satisfy some of the basic needs of the population, but it provides manifest example that the government is working on behalf of the needs of its people. On the other hand, insurgents will work to neutralize the aforementioned efforts by attacking basic services in the hope of demonstrating governmental weakness while attempting to foment disgruntlement among the citizenry against the government and the security forces associated with it. Accordingly, an effective counter-insurgency campaign must be prepared to provide basic services to the citizenry, but must do so on a virtually continuous and non-degraded manner. Consequently, a counter-insurgency campaign must aim at reducing some of the social ills which lead to corruption while implementing procedures for greater accountability, particularly among governmental entities.
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Additionally, security forces must be sensitive as to how punishment is meted out to individuals suspected of corruption.
Respect for local norms of honor and dignity should be complied with to the greatest extent host-nation laws and US Army values permit. outlined therein will always be relevant to the study of counter-insurgency warfare. To be sure, more analysis can and should be conducted about the nature of insurgencies in light of the assumption the U.S. will likely be involved in such warfare for the foreseeable future. For instance, there at least two important areas which this essay has not covered but are worthy of further of analysis pertaining to counter-insurgency; that of hybrid warfare and the transformation of a guerrilla war into a conventional war.
With respect to hybrid warfare, an insurgency can be combined with a conventional campaign as was evinced in Vietnam. The Viet Cong consisted of both conventional and guerrilla forces and often worked closely with the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). Throughout much of the war, the Viet Cong and NVA conducted simultaneous attacks against U.S. and ARVN forces. Accordingly, adopting a strictly counter-insurgency approach to this kind of warfare will likely prove to be fatally deficient. An analysis of the interplay (how one supports the other) between conventional and insurgent operations, particularly the nexus points between the two, is an area requiring further study.
Another dynamic about insurgencies is there ability to morph into a conventional campaign. The Chinese Revolution started as a guerrilla movement. The poorly led, low morale and highly corrupt Nationalist Army proved no match against Mao Zedong's highly trained and disciplined People's Liberation Army (PLA). As Nationalist units surrendered, the PLA acquired the heavy equipment which served as the materiel foundation for a well orchestrated conventional campaign. Essentially, guerrilla leaders and fighters became proficient in conventional battles at the operational level. Therefore, another fruitful area for the study of counter-insurgency warfare is the way in which insurgencies can develop into conventional 19 warfare and how counter-insurgency doctrine must be properly synchronized with conventional warfare doctrine in order to keep pace with the transformation.
The aforementioned points notwithstanding, understanding and mastering the principles discussed in this essay is essential for optimizing the conditions of success in the insurgency environment by the battlefield commander. The extent to which one principle or set of principles require(s) greater application is a matter of context; a recent study by RAND/National Defense Research Institute clearly supports this point. 22 Nevertheless, the purpose of this essay is to help frame and refine our understanding of insurgency warfare so we can develop and implement effective measures against it. 
